One of my longstanding pet peeves is making the rhetorical
moves away from . . . .well . . . . social context, politics, culture. . .
whatever one wishes to call being concerned about justice and paying attention
to larger contexts. I understand that Hollis’s book is focused on exploring the
ways that discussing the Shadow affords us different ways to think about
ethics, but I was unhappy with this particular chapter, and it points to a
limitation of the book.
My vague discomfort became a clear complaint when I read the
section of the chapter where Hollis discusses domestic violence and stalking.
He forgoes discussing misogyny and entitlement, which are the obvious ways, for
me, to frame those behaviors, and he instead discusses them as manifestations
of a “weak ego” that has an immature relationship with its Shadow: “The more
damaged one’s history, or the weaker one’s sense of self, the greater is this
narcissistic tendency and the more rigid and controlling the dynamics of the
relationship. When we see a relationship gone horribly wrong, when the
boyfriend shoes up to shoot his girlfriend, we are seeing weak ego that has
succumbed to the archaic message that ‘I will perish if I do not have the Other
at my command’” (92-93).
Good lord.
I don’t necessarily think is an inaccurate description, but
it seems, to me, to be missing the point by a pretty big margin. One idea that
we have introduced to this year is that feminist therapists have sometimes made
a distinction between “common couple violence” and “Patriarchal terrorism.”
This maps nicely onto a distinction I have long made between “ugly fighting,”
which might include cruel words and even physical violence, and “abuse,” which
is a deliberate system of manipulation that does not respect the personhood of
another person. The degree to which abuse is really consciously “calculated” is
not relevant to me. “Ugly fighting” is wrong and possibly dangerous, but it is
qualitatively different from abuse. (I will follow Doherty on this one and have
a moral opinion. Trying to hurt someone, even if not physically, in a moment of
passion is wrong.)
It seems quite clear that Hollis is discussing, in this
passage and in the footnote expanding the discussion to include behavior
talking, abuse or patriarchal terrorism. (Although those are two different
concepts, whichever term the reader prefers is fine in this case.) If I want to
understand the thought processes that lead to that kind of behavior, talking
about them in terms of gender and social justice makes a lot more sense to me
than talking about the Shadow. I simply do not see the value in coming up with
complex psychoanalytic riffs on attachment to discuss the most obvious,
tangible, and awful manifestations of sexism.
I am reminded of the cretinous "men's rights movement," which is a largely online anti-feminist movement that is mostly bizarre pseudo-Darwinian nonsense and rape apology. I could certainly describe those people using Hollis' framework. One of the lessons I learned in academia is that when one they had better be able to answer the question "what does that afford?"
I am reminded of the cretinous "men's rights movement," which is a largely online anti-feminist movement that is mostly bizarre pseudo-Darwinian nonsense and rape apology. I could certainly describe those people using Hollis' framework. One of the lessons I learned in academia is that when one they had better be able to answer the question "what does that afford?"
Here is a good link: http://wehuntedthemammoth.com/
(I am aware that Hollis describes societies and communities
as having Shadows and Hollis uses strong moral language throughout the book. I
do not mean to suggest that Hollis excuses bad behavior or that he does not
consider social context. This chapter just seems like going around your ass to
get to your elbow, and it downplays the “political” aspects of sexism. My
reservations about psychoanalytic theory really came to the forefront when I
was reading the passages quoted above.)
I thought Dohrty’s chapter on Justice which provided some discussion
of feminist perspectives might inform therapy, was a lot better. When we
recognize the ways that historical inequalities make themselves present in the
therapy room, we have the duty to have opinions about what we are seeing, and
we have the responsibility to, carefully, suggest our perspectives to our
clients. We are not to instruct our clients on right behavior, but to engage
them in dialogue that takes ethics, and for me, politics, into account. Doherty
writes: “The central distinction between a moralistic therapy and a morally
sensitive therapy, between moral pedagogy and moral consultation, is revealed
by the therapist’s response when the client disagrees with the therapist’s
moral position, perhaps even decides to act counter to the therapist’s
suggestion.” (pg. 65).
Of course in situations as dire as the examples Hollis
provides we would not continue the moral back and forth that Doherty describes,
but Doherty’s more straightforward approach fits those better, for me, also.
| I do not have much interest in talking about these guys in terms of the Shadow. |
(I am aware that I have framed some of this issues in terms
of heterosexual relationships when men are the abusers, which is problematic. I
do not mean to suggest that women cannot be abusive, controlling or obsessive,
and I do not mean to suggest that these issues are not pertinent to same sex
couples. The data about the prevalence of this stuff in different kinds of
relationships is a bit fuzzy, as I understand it. I do know there is not much
argument that men who abuse women are not the most lethal, and certainly I have
run across, in my life, more incidences of men being scary in the ways
discussed in the post than women. I do not mean to say that conventional
patriarchy is what all domestic violence is about, but the stuff described in
the chapter fits that category quite easily.
I should note that I like a lot of what Hollis has to say. When I get testy is when his psychoanalytic frame seems to displace better ways of thinking about a problem. I like the way he talks about unacknowledged desires and fears, and I like the way he talks about the ugly side of collective consciousness. I am not much of a fan of the way he talks about depression or domestic violence.)
I should note that I like a lot of what Hollis has to say. When I get testy is when his psychoanalytic frame seems to displace better ways of thinking about a problem. I like the way he talks about unacknowledged desires and fears, and I like the way he talks about the ugly side of collective consciousness. I am not much of a fan of the way he talks about depression or domestic violence.)
Jamie,
ReplyDeleteI haven’t quite gotten to chapter 5 in Hollis’s book, but I’m very interested to read it now. I’ll be on the look-out for the topics you described! As for Doherty, I appreciate you adding and discussing his quote. Those words stuck with me, as well. I appreciate balance and I think that Doherty’s perspective on discussing his and client’s morals is attuned to the importance of addressing these topics and the sensitivity and respect that must be present for the client to be receptive to such discussions.
p.s. Your posts are always entertaining! You are awesome.